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ABSTRACT 
Judicial independence is a pillar of New Zealand's constitution, and is further recognised as a 
fundamental human right. In order to protect this independence it must be very difficult to remove a judge from 
office. In common with all state institutions however, the judiciary is coming under increasing scrutiny from the 
public who are concerned about a perceived lack of accountability. This is especially so after an episode of judicial 
misconduct occurs. Although this lack of accountability may be more apparent than real, the public are largely 
ignorant or misinformed about the constitutional role of the judges, and the various mechanisms that ensure judges 
are answerable for their behaviour, both on and off the bench. This has the potential to lead to a dangerous loss of 
public confidence in the judiciary. 
This paper suggests that, with the current interest in the establishment of a judicial commission in New 
Zealand, the time is ripe for the judiciary to develop new techniques of accountability that are consistent with 
judicial independence and that will enhance the public's respect for the judiciary. Radical overhaul is unnecessary. 
Modest changes, together with improved communication between the judiciary and the public, will suffice. 
The Canadian Judicial Council has developed the practice of expressing disapproval of a judge ' s conduct 
where the behaviour that is the subject of a complaint is more than minor but does not warrant a recommendation 
of removal from office. This practice has been effective in Canada over the last decade and is an exan1ple worthy 
of following in New Zealand. 
Word Length : 14423 words (excluding contents page, abstract, footnotes and bibliography) 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Judicial independence requires that judges be accountable only to the law and 
to their conscience. Mistakes in law can be corrected on appeal. Decisions can be 
criticised in the media and in the academic literature. A quiet word in the ear of a 
judge who has treated litigants and others with less than desirable tact, or who has 
been tardy in delivering judgment, has always been employed by the judiciary as an 
effective method of reining in the errant judge. The judiciary must decide cases 
"without fear or favour, affection or ill will," 1 and therefore must not seek popularity. 
They must, at the same time however, ensure continuing public confidence in the 
Courts. This is because, as Justice Felix Frankfurter colourfully explained, "[t]he 
Court's authority, consisting of neither the purse nor the sword, rests ultimately on 
substantial public confidence in its moral sanction."2 
If a judge behaves very badly he or she may be removed from office following 
an address of Parliament. However, there is no formal method of addressing 
misconduct that falls beneath the appropriately very high threshold required for 
removal but that is more than minor. Instead the responses may include uninformed 
and constitutionally suspect governmental comment,3 high levels of media coverage, 
and institutional silence from the judiciary. The net result is to leave the community 
with the feeling that the judge has just "got away with it," while remaining ignorant of 
the constitutional reasons why this appears to be so. The recent case of High Court 
Justice Robert Fisher's use of the Internet to access pornography highlighted the 
issues surrounding the accountability of judges and appropriate responses to judicial 
misconduct. 
This aim of this paper is to suggest a modest and principled improvement to 
the system of judicial accountability to deal with such "intermediate" level 
misconduct. Improvement is necessary because the notion of accountability from 
public officeholders is increasingly important. Gone are the days of unquestioning 
1 Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, sl8 . 
2 Cited in Stephen Parker Courts and the Public (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, 
Victoria, 1996) 16. 
3 See, for example, "Cabinet to Discuss Sex-site Judge" (18 February 2002) The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland I . 
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deference to those in positions of authority such as doctors and judges. This should be 
seen as a positive, since public confidence based on understanding must be preferable. 
But such sentiments are problematic as regards the judiciary because accountability 
may conflict with the fundamental pillar of the constitution that is judicial 
independence. This notion of independence may even necessitate overriding public 
discomfort with some examples of misbehaviour that the public sees judges "getting 
away with." 
Although judicial independence and accountability are not ultimately 
reconcilable, it is preferable, and indeed necessary, to stop using the two concepts as 
"argumentative incantations,"4 so that public confidence in the judiciary may be 
improved whilst the balance of power between the three branches of government is 
protected. At present, because there is no avenue to address legitimate concerns about 
some types of judicial behaviour, political comment is more likely, even if it is 
unconstitutional. This can be seen as an ad hoe attempt to fill the gap. There may be 
times when it is appropriate for the executive to comment on the judiciary, where the 
issue is a matter of legitimate public concern. On the other hand, any executive 
comment on the judiciary has the potential to undermine independence and, as 
importantly, public confidence in the legal system, which is essential to uphold its 
legitimacy. 
This paper will examine the principles of judicial independence and 
accountability, and the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. 
It will then examine options for improving responses to judicial misconduct. The 
Ministry of Justice is currently proposing, as part of a Judicial Matters Bill , the 
statutory establishment of a Judicial Commission based on the New South Wales 
Commission.5 A New Zealand Commission would comprise the heads of courts and 
members of the public, and would consider all complaints about all judicial officers. 
The paper will examine the New South Wales Commission ' s complaints process and 
that of the Canadian Judicial Council. It will advocate adopting the practice of the 
Canadian Judicial Council, who may issue an expression of disapproval of a judge's 
4A M Gleeson Foreword in Helen Cunningham (ed) Fragile Bastion: Judicial Independence in the 
Nineties and Beyond (Judicial Commission of New South Wales , Sydney, 1997) xi . 
5 " Proposed Judicial Matters Bill" law Talk 585 (I July 2002) 6. 
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conduct after investigation of a complaint. This is a better model for New Zealand 
because it preserves judicial independence whilst ensuring that complainants' 
concerns are taken seriously. New Zealand can take advantage of the Canadian 
experience where, over the last decade, this practice has gone from being seen as 
some sort of judicial treason to part of the mainstream of judicial discipline. 
The establishment of a Judicial Commission in New Zealand could be an 
excellent opportunity for the judiciary to take the lead in creating a more credible 
system of accountability and ending the "judicial lockjaw"
6 that surrounds 
misconduct. Expressions of disapproval, together with the formulation of ethical 
standards for judges, and improved communication with the public, are achievable 
steps the judiciary could take through a Judicial Commission. Such steps could go a 
long way towards enhancing public confidence in the judiciary and preventing 
interference from the political branches of government. If the judiciary can 
themselves deal appropriately with misconduct, there is no need for outside 
interference, and there should therefore be no change to the convention proscribing 
executive comment on the judiciary. 
Judicial misbehaviour is rare in New Zealand. This should be a source of pride 
and comfort, but not a reason to retain the status quo, which is rather uncertain, and 
does nothing to address public ignorance and misinformation about the judiciary. At 
the same time however, it is sensible to heed the warning of former Chief Justice Sir 
Thomas Eichelbaum who has said that, although systems which had served well in the 
past may no longer suffice, "knee-jerk reactions to aberrant events affecting the 
judiciary should be avoided."7 
II JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The New Zealand system of government is said to be "built on two 
complementary and lawfully unalterable principles: the operation of a democratic 
6 Frances Kahn Zemans "The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence" (I 999) 72 S Cal 
L Rev 625, 636. 
7 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum" The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( 1997) 6 Canta L Rev 421 , 435. 
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legislature and the operation of independent courts."8 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights affirms the fundamental nature of judicial independence. Article 10 
states that; "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charge against him."90ther international documents and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 reinforce the importance of a judiciary free from 
political or other influence or interference. 10 
A Individual Independence 
1 Security of Tenure 
The Act of Settlement 1700 established the principle of judicial independence 
in England where judges had previously held office at the Crown's pleasure. They 
could now only be removed in limited circumstances. In New Zealand today the 
Constitution Act 1986 protects this independence in much the same manner. Section 
23 states: 
A Judge of the High Court shall not be removed from office except by the Sovereign 
or the Governor-General , acting upon an address of the House of Representatives, 
which address may be moved only on the grounds of that Judge ' s misbehaviour or of 
the Judge's incapacity to discharge the functions of that Judge ' s office. 
Section 24 provides that judges' salaries cannot be reduced during their term of office. 
These are similar to provisions that were included in the Judicature Act 1908, the 
Supreme Court Act 1882, the Supreme Court Judges Act 1858, and the New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1853 as enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament. 
The Constitution Act is concerned with the independence of individual judges 
from the Executive. In other words the government for the time being should not be 
able to influence judicial decisions by political pressure. Judges can only be removed 
8 Sir Robin Cooke " Fundamentals" [ 1988] NZLJ 158, 164. 
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) GA Res 271A (III), 3(1) UN GAOR Resolutions 71 , 
UN Doc N 8 I O (1948). 
10 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 14; Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth 
<http://www.cpahq .org/guidelines/ index.htm> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
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for incapacity or misbehaviour, and this further reqmres agreement of both the 
executive and legislative branches. It has never happened in New Zealand. The 
protection afforded to judicial salaries ensures freedom from financial pressure. The 
Constitution Act protection against removal only applies to High Court and Court of 
Appeal judges. The Governor-General may remove District Court judges on the 
advice of the Minister of Justice. This advice would be tendered on the grounds of 
inability or misbehaviour. 11 Joseph notes that most District Court judges would rather 
resign than face dismissal, and that resignation is rare, but has occurred, reputedly 
under veiled threat of the Minister. 12 
An extension to the Constitution Act was proposed in 1999 to bring the 
removal of other judges in line with the removal process for High Court and Court of 
Appeal judges. 13 This proposal has since lapsed, 14 but has resurfaced in the Judicial 
Matters Bill being developed by the Ministry of Justice. 15 One consequence of this 
proposal is that the removal process is far more likely to be used given the large 
increase in the number of judges subject to removal following an address of 
Parliament. Because Parliament has the responsibility for making the removal 
decision it is vital that a clear process be established. 
2 Convention 
Convention supplements the legal protections. Politics plays no part in the 
appointment process. 16 Ministers and public servants do not criticise judicial decisions 
11 District Courts Act 1947, s7. 
12 Philip Joseph "Constitutional Law" [ 1998) NZ Law Rev 198. 
13 Constitution Amendment Bill 1999, no 274-2 . 
14 See Vernon Small "Judges to Go Under the Spotlight" (3 September 2002) New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, I. 
15 See " Proposed Judicial Matters Bill" (I July 2002) 585 Law Talk 6. 
16Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive?" 
in B D Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Wellington, 
Brookers, 1995) 11 , 44 . But see Andrew P Stockley "Judicial Independence: The New Zealand 
Experience" ( I 997) 3 Aust J Legal Hist 145, 14 7-149, who notes that this was not the case in 
nineteenth century New Zealand where " patronage rather than legal experience was determinative of 
Britain ' s appointments to colonial judgeships." However, from I 935 onwards, Stockley notes that 
successive governments have avoided making political appointments. He also notes that the same can 
be said of Britain since 1914, but not of Australia or Canada. There have been Government ministers 
appointed to the Australian High Court, and political patronage among the lower levels of the Canadian 
judiciary. 
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or reflect adversely on the impartiality, personal views, or ability of a judge. 17 The 
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives impose restrictions on members of 
Parliament who must not "use offensive words against the House or against any 
member of the judiciary," or refer to any matter awaiting, or under adjudication, in 
any court. 18 In return judges do not publicly comment on political or contentious 
issues. 
Convention is not always followed. A graphic example of a breach of the 
convention proscribing executive criticism of the judiciary was seen in 1995, when 
Cabinet Minister John Banks claimed on talk-back radio that most District Court 
Judges were, "second-rate lawyers," who could not make a living in private practice, 
and had little to offer the judicial system. 19 The Chief District Court Judge 
complained to the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, asking, "if the 
conventions about comments between the judiciary and the government are to be 
ignored in this way, then what hope have our democratic institutions?" Banks 
apologised, but shortly after criticised another District Court Judge over a sentencing 
decision. This time the Chief Justice personally complained to the Prime Minister, and 
the Attorney-General condemned the comments as "unacceptable."20 More recently, 
the current Minister of Justice has criticised Judges for not understanding a new 
Sentencing Act in a manner described as "constitutionally improper."21 
Notwithstanding such lapses, convention remains an important constitutional 
safeguard against encroachment by one branch of government on another's territory . 
As the Court of Appeal has said: 22 
New Zealand's constitutional arrangements are based on conventions that delimit the 
respective roles of the legislature, the executive, and the Courts. The legitimacy of 
each institution depends to no small extent on the respect it pays to these conventions 
17 Cabinet Manual <http: //www.dpmc.govt.nzJcabinet/manual/2a.html#2. I I 5> (last accessed 9 
September 2002) paras 2 .1 15-2. 118. 
18 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (House of Representatives, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 1999) Standing Orders I I 2 and I 14. 
19 "Talk back Lands Banks in Strife" The Press Christchurch 19 May 1995. 
20 "Talk back Lands Banks in Strife" The Press Christchurch 19 May 1995 . 
2 1 Jonathan Milne "Judges Getting it Wrong says Goff' (3 August 2002) Dominion Post Wellington 2. 
22 Shaw v Commissioner of inland Revenue ( 19 April 1999) Court of Appeal CA 218/97 para 16. 
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and to the other branches of government. 
Thus conventions guard the constitutional divide between the branches of government 
and the rule of law itself. 
3 Internal Independence 
Members of the judiciary must also enJoy independence vis-a-vis their 
colleagues and judicial superiors.23 This is a facet of independence that is not often 
discussed, but is important to note in order to understand why no formal disciplinary 
mechanisms have developed within the judiciary itself. If judges are not free from the 
influence of other members of the judiciary it is said that the possibility exists of a 
judge giving decisions, not solely from his or her determination of the law, but 
influenced by the effects of the decision on his or her career.24 
The establishment of various courts of specialist jurisdiction has brought with 
it a corresponding increase in senior judges or heads of courts. This must have the 
result of increasing hierarchical patterns in the judiciary. It is said that this 
development has the potential to, at worst, bring about attempts by judges to influence 
other judges' decisions, or at least give rise to "latent pressures on the judges which 
may result in subservience to judicial superiors."25 Palmer has said that the 
appointment of principal judges for particular parts of the District Court has got out of 
hand because too many centres of authority and administration are undesirable.26 
They may however be a necessary consequence of specialisation and increasing 
workloads, making it necessary for each court to control its own procedure for 
assigning lists and dealing with administrative matters, which may also include 
discipline. 
23 Hon T David Marshall Judicial Conduct and Accountability (Carswell , Ontario, 1995) 89. 
24 Marshall , above, 89. 
25 Shimon Shetreet "The Limits of Judicial Accountability: A Hard Look at the Judicial Officers Act 
1986" (1987) 10 UNSWLJ 4, 11. 
26 Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive?" 
in B D Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Wellington, 
Brookers, 1995) 11 , 40. 
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B Institutional Independence 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognised that judicial independence is not 
only concerned with the individual independence of the judge, as seen in the 
protections against removal and reduction of salary. It is also "the institutional 
independence of the court of tribunal over which he or she presides."27 This means 
that judges, and not the executive or the legislature, should administer matters having 
a direct bearing on the exercise of the judicial role. Otherwise a danger exists of the 
executive exerting improper influence through control of resources and allocation of 
services to the judiciary. In New Zealand this facet of independence has been said to 
be the area in which judicial independence "has been at its most fictional,"28 since the 
government funds the judicial system, owns the buildings, and holds the 
administration supporting the judiciary accountable. 
After some judicial criticism of this situation and a government review, the 
Department for Courts was established in 1995.29 It is based on the separate executive 
department model rather than the autonomous department model. That is , the 
Department's sole function is the administration of the courts, and is responsible to 
the Minister for Courts rather than to the judiciary. This represents a shift away from 
complete governmental control, as it is "administration by executive department, with 
regular judicial consultation."30 However, it is not judicial governance, and therefore 
institutional independence has still not been fully achieved. 
C How Far Does Judicial Independence Reach? 
The concepts of independence and impartiality are said to be fundamental to 
the capacity of courts to do justice and to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice. 31 Independence is a necessary condition of impartiality, 
27 Valente v R [ I 985] 2 SCR 673, 687 Le Dain J. 
28 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum" The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( 1997) 6 Canta L Rev 421 , 423 . 
29 See, for example, Eichelbaum "Judicial Independence - Fact or Fiction? [ 1993] NZLJ 90; Tompkins 
"The Independence of the Judiciary" [1994] NZLJ 285. 
30 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum" The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( 1997) 6 Canta L Rev 421, 423 . 
31 Valente v R [1985] 2 SCR 673, 685 Le Dain J. 
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which is the crucial precondition for a justice system where, in the criminal context 
and increasingly in the civil context,32 the judge alone stands between the individual 
citizen and the Executive. 
It is, however, a misconception that judicial independence means the judges 
have a free rein. It is not widely understood by the public that judicial independence 
exists for the benefit of the community. 33 As Miller puts it: 34 
It is important to remember that the underlying purpose of judicial independence is to 
protect against executive intimidation and consequent loss of public confidence, not 
to safeguard judges from incompetence or mistakes . It does not exist to benefit 
judges personally. 
Thus independence is concerned only with freedom from improper influences on 
judicial decision-making. Of course there are many proper influences on judges that 
are crucial to the exercise of their role. These include substantive rules of law and of 
procedure, the judge's own values and norms, the values and norms of the Judiciary 
as an institution, and of the society in which the judge serves. It can never be desirable 
that judges be independent to the point where they may disregard values, attitudes or 
practices of the judiciary and of the community. 
III JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability sits uneasily with the concept of independence. As Keith says, 
"Judges as a group are not elected and not representative and are not responsible in 
the constitutional sense."35 This does not mean the judiciary is untouchable, although 
their position can be seen as somewhat odd in a democratic political system. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines accountability as "liability to give account of, and 
answer for, discharge of duties or conduct. "36 Although judges are not politically 
accountable, or legally accountable, except in the most serious cases of abuse, it can 
32 For example the growth of tribunals such as the Commerce Commission . 
33 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum " The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( I 997) 6 Canta L Rev 421 , 422 . 
34 Raymond Miller(ed) Ne w Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
2001) 68-70. 
35 K J Keith "A Judicial Commission? Some Comments on the Independence of the Judiciary" [1983] 
ZLJ 239, 240. 
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rightly be seen that judges are accountable in the sense that they must be responsive to 
the community.37 
A The Principle of Open Justice 
Judges are generally required to give reasons for their decisions. This is not an 
invariable rule, but the Court of Appeal has recently said that reasons are desirable as 
an important part of the principle of open justice, to provide for the possibility of 
review by a higher court, and as providing "discipline for the Judge which is the best 
protection against wrong or arbitrary decisions and inconsistent delivery of justice."38 
Furthermore the Court strongly suggested that the imposition of a general rule 
requiring judges to give reasons might not be too far off. 39 Judicial reasons are of 
course open to scrutiny and criticism by the public, academics, and the legal 
profession, enabling the legitimacy of the decision to be measured. This "publicity," 
as Bentham said," ... is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and 
the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while trying, 
under trial."40 
The role of the media in keeping judges accountable should not be 
underestimated. It is only the media that constantly and publicly criticises judges. As 
Shetreet has pointed out, the media also convey to the courts the sense of the 
community on matters pending before them. This public reaction can affect either 
consciously or unconsciously the decision of the court. 41 It is, sadly however, a fact of 
life that the everyday work of the courts is just not news, unless it is coverage of high 
profile criminal cases. In contrast, any, even minor, slip by a judge, is likely to prove 
newsworthy. Judges do not want to be criticised in the media and this threat hangs 
over them always. Because judges traditionally have not responded to criticism, they 
are prevented from defending themselves when the actors from other branches of 
36 Oxford English Dictionary (2ed, 1998, Clarendon Press, Oxford) 87 . 
37 R L Young "Judicial Independence and Accountability in New Zealand" ( 1998) 45 DEC Fed Law, 
40, 42. 
38 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 547, 565-567 (CA). 
39 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above, 567. 
40 Jeremy Bentham Benthamiana, or Select Extracts from the Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843) 115. 
41 
See Shimon ShetreetJudges on Trial: A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English 
Judicia,y (North Holland Publishing Co, New York, 1976) 179-185. 
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government are not. The law of contempt, in the form of "scandalising the court," 
once restrained attacks against judges, and was justified as an answer to this judicial 
reticence.42 Contempt of court has largely disappeared however, as freedom of speech 
has increased.43 There are signs that the judiciary may not be as reticent in future. 
Recently, a judge who was the subject of extreme criticism from a radio talk-back 
host successfully used defamation proceedings in response.
44 
B Appeals 
The existence of the appeal process recognises that judges can and do make 
mistakes. It provides a mechanism for correcting judicial error and for ensuring 
adherence to legal norms. Although technically an appeal reaches only the decision, 
the judge's behaviour may also be publicly criticised. In 1995 the Court of Appeal 
ordered new trials in two cases where the approach to the trial by the judge was 
described as unacceptably suggesting, "some shift away from the New Zealand 
tradition of a fair trial, in the direction of a more active semi-prosecutorial 
participation by the judge. "4
5 The Court further stated that, "the stress for those 
involved may mean a human cost exceeding the wastage of state resources."
46 
Although couched in judicial understatement, it is difficult to understand this as 
anything other than a public rebuke of the judge's conduct. 
C Informal Discipline 
Judges are also subject to informal discipline by their head of court or by the 
Chief Justice. Chief Judges have no formal authority over judges of their court, and 
although the Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary, she is not the employer or 
superior of the other judges. Instead, her constitutional position is described as that of 
"first among equals."47 A former Chief Justice has said, "[w]e can draw the subject 
42 Shetreet, above, 185-186. 
43 Hon Michael Kirby " Attacks on Judges - A Universal Phenomenon" (I 998) 72 ALJ 599, 603. 
44 Tom Cardy "Judge Wins Payout in Radio Slander" (19 August 2002) Dominion Post A3 . 
45 See Robert Mannion "Appeal Court says Justice must be Seen to be Done" The Dominion 
Wellington ( 11 September 1995) 11. 
46 Mannion, above, I I. 
47 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum " The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( 1997) 6 Canta L Rev 421 , 431 . 
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matter of the complaint to the Judge's notice, counsel the Judge, or administer some 
form of private or (rarely) public rebuke."
48 Shetreet's study of the English judiciary 
found that, in some situations, pressure might be quietly put on a judge to resign. The 
judge may resign on the grounds of "ill health" at a later time after the incident that 
gave rise to the pressure.49 This informal discipline is generally seen as being 
effective in practice. Sankar notes that professional independence is a facet of judicial 
independence, which is often ignored, but critical to understanding why judges resist 
some approaches to judicial control while accepting others. In other words judges will 
respond better to discipline imposed from within the profession than that which is 
imposed by outside bureaucratic controls. On this analysis any system of disciplining 
the judiciary has a greater chance of success if the judges are, as a group, heavily 
involved in the formulation and carrying out of the process. Since the judiciary can be 
described as "a tribe with only chiefs,"
50 it is said that they respond better to 
persuasion than to formal processes. 51 
However the public is suspicious of professional organisations disciplining 
their own. Informal judicial discipline has limited visibility, and is therefore beyond 
public scrutiny. Critics assert that a self-protective "guild mentality" takes over when 
a member of a professional group is accused of an infraction.
52 Proponents note 
however, that informal discipline is administered regularly and effectively, being a 
common-sense approach to maintaining both judicial independence and 
accountability. 53 This makes perfect sense as the misconduct of one judge has the 
potential to reflect badly on the judiciary as a whole. Ellis sums up both sides of the 
argument by stating that, "[j]udges are by inclination and training able to manage their 
own affairs. However, they must be seen to do so."
54 
48 Eichelbaum, above, 431. 
49 Shimon Shetreet Judges on Trial: A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English 
Judiciary (1976, North Holland, New York) 253-254. 
5° Clifford Wallace " Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe With Only Chiefs" 
(1978) BYUL Rev 39. 
51 Sambhav N Sankar " Disciplining the Professional Judge" (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 1233, 1239. 
52 Anthony D' Amato " Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could be Mis-Regulation" (1990) 89 
Mich L Rev 609 . 
53 Charles Gardner Geyh " Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline" ( 1993) 142 U Pa L Rev 243, 246 ; 
Harry T Edwards " Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining " Good Behaviour" for Federal 
Judges" (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 765 , 779-780. 
54 A AT Ellis QC " Do We Need a Judicial Commission?" [1983] NZLJ 206,210. 
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D Judicial Complaints Process 
The Judicial Complaints Process was established by the Attorney-General and 
the Chief Justice in 1999, and has formalised procedures for making complaints 
against judges' conduct. 55 This is not a statutory procedure, but merely sets out the 
existing convention that the head of bench informally disciplines judges, with the 
addition of a lay observer to act in the public interest. 
Complaints are referred to the relevant head of bench who determines 
whether the complaint has substance. The lay observer may review any decision not 
to proceed with a complaint. If a complaint proceeds, the head of court will refer it to 
the judge in question, consider the response, make further enquiries if appropriate, 
and determine how to deal with the matter appropriately. Seeking an apology from the 
judge to the complainant, or assisting the judge to avoid a reoccurrence of the conduct 
under complaint are possibilities. 56 If a complaint was considered serious enough to 
possibly warrant removal, it would be referred to the Attorney-General who would 
convene a panel of retired judges to investigate the complaint fully. Depending on the 
findings of the panel, the Attorney-General would initiate the removal process.
57 
Recent statistics, over a twelve month period, state that there were no 
complaints against Court of Appeal Judges, four against High Court Judges and 24 
against District Court Judges. One High Court Judge was counselled about body 
language. One District Court Judge apologised to a litigant, while another complaint 
involving delay was resolved by being brought to the attention of the judge. The 
others were dismissed, generally because they were complaints about the outcome of 
a case where an appeal was more appropriate. 
58 
Critics of judicial complaints systems complain that the easy availability of 
such procedures will result in an increase of people, especially disgruntled litigants, 
55 Judicial Complaints Process <http://www.courts.govt.nzJpublications/judicial_ complaints.pd f.> (last 
accessed 8 July 2002). 
56 Judicial Complaints Process, above, 5. 
57 Judicial Complaints Process, above, 9. 
58 Report of the New Zealand Judiciary 1999 <http: //www.courts.govt.nzJpublications/Judiciary-
report I 999.pdf.> (last accessed 8 July 2002). 
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who may wish to "roll up for a shot" at the judge.59 This, they say, will have the effect 
of chilling judicial independence, as judges tailor their decisions to avoid complaint. 
With respect, this concern is overstated. The statistics show a low number of 
complaints, most of which are appropriately and immediately dismissed. Many people 
would have complained anyway, but now have a formal procedure to follow. This 
formality may reassure complainants that their concerns have at least been taken 
seriously, even if the complaint has been dismissed. Others, who may not have 
previously complained, but may have been left feeling frustrated, now have a possible 
action to pursue. Declining to set up a mechanism to deal with complaints, merely 
because people might be tempted to use it, is an unattractive proposition in a modern 
democracy. 
The Judicial Complaints Process has been criticised as being a "loose 
arrangement,"60 but it has provided a clearer and more transparent process for dealing 
with complaints about judges' behaviour, with the addition of an impartial review by 
the lay observer. It has however, only been regarded as an interim measure until other 
legislation was enacted.61 The recognition that more formal processes are needed to 
deal with complaints is a positive first step in building a more credible system of 
accountability which will best meet the needs of both the public and the judiciary. 
E Should Judges be More Accountable? 
The perception that greater judicial accountability is required has gathered 
momentum as the belief that the law was a set of truths to be revealed no longer 
holds.62 The business of judging has become more overtly political. 63 Judges openly 
admit that they make value judgments and make law.64 In 1995 Palmer said: 65 
59 Hon Justice Thomas AM Judicial Ethics in Australia (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1988) 89. 
60 P Schnauer (5 May 1999) NZPD 16375. 
6 1 Anthony Hubbard "Judgement Day" (24 February 2002) Sunday Star Times 3. 
62 Lord Reid "The Judge as Lawmaker" [ 1972] The Journal of Public Teachers of Law, 22 . 
63 For example the growth in Treaty of Waitangi and Bill of Rights jurisprudence. 
64 See, for example, Sir lvor Richardson " The Role of Judges as Policy Makers" (1985) 15 VUWLR 
46 ; E W Thomas " A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of Judicial 
Autonomy" (1993 , YUW Monograph No 5). 
65 Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive?" 
in B D Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, 
Wellington, 1995) 11 , 55 . 
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How far the public will go in tolerating increased judicial independence without 
increased accountability is an interesting point. At present, Judges are more popular 
than politicians, but this may not remain so. The more power the Judges have, the 
more likely their exercise of it will be called into question. 
In 2002 it can probably be said that judges are no longer more popular than 
politicians. This year we have a relatively popular government, and a judiciary under 
attack in the media fairly regularly for sentencing decisions,66 along with occasional 
episodes of judicial misbehaviour that make the public question the accountability and 
exercise of judicial power. We also have the spectre of an even more powerful tier of 
the judiciary looming large on the constitutional horizon, when a Supreme Court is 
established as New Zealand's final court, and appeals to the Privy Council are 
abolished. This will further increase the political importance of judicial lawmaking. It 
is likely to bring increasing calls for greater judicial accountability, which judges may 
have to accept as a consequence of their increasingly public role. Because of the 
pervasive influence of the media, the large number of people affected by judicial 
decisions, and greater public scrutiny of all state institutions generally, the judiciary 
must also accept the responsibility of explaining what it is that the judiciary actually 
does. 
IV PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
Public confidence is an essential concomitant of both judicial independence 
and accountability. As a former Australian High Court Judge noted, "what ultimately 
protects the independence of the judiciary is a community consensus that 
independence is a quality worth preserving."67 But the community is not likely to 
protect what it does not understand. Explanations of the importance of judicial 
independence do not strike the same chord with the public as calls for increased 
accountability. Political criticism of judges can damage public confidence and 
undermine judicial independence.68 Sadly, Hon Michael Kirby, who has written 
66 See, for example, Jonathan Milne "Judges Getting it Wrong says Goff' (3 August 2002) Dominion 
Post Wellington, 2. 
67 Sir Ninian Stevens "Judicial Independence-A Fragile Bastion" (I 982) 13 MULR 334,339. 
68 See Hon Justice Michael Kirby "Attacks on Judges-A Universal Phenomenon" (1998) 72 ALJ 599. 
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extensively on this issue,69 was himself the subject of an allegation by a senator, who 
using parliamentary privilege, asserted that the judge had used an official 
Commonwealth car to pick up underage boys in Sydney's gay prostitute area. The 
evidence tendered was a logbook, which quickly proved to be a forgery. The senator, 
whose anti-homosexual views were well known, apologised and lost his cabinet post, 
but retained his senate job.70 Unfortunately for the judge, he is as likely to be 
remembered for these allegations as he is for the undisputed contribution he has made 
to the Australian legal system. 
As discussed above, it is difficult for judges to respond to such attacks, 
although a solid foundation of community confidence in the judiciary could go a long 
way towards lessening their impact. This requires the judiciary to be proactive and 
work towards building public confidence. As the Chief Justice of South Australia 
l · h 71 exp ams, e: 
... consider[s] that it is unrealistic today to say that public confidence will be 
maintained if the judiciary simply performs its judicial function properly and 
conducts itself appropriately . I believe that if we acknowledge that public 
understanding of the institution underpins public support, we should equally accept 
that it is our role to promote that public understanding. 
Consistently with these sentiments, there are a number of developments 
pointing towards judicial recognition of the need for greater responsiveness towards 
the community. 
A Talking to the Community 
United States Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg has said that in carrying out 
their functions , judges participate in a dialogue with the other organs of government 
69 See) for example) Hon Justice Michael Kirby " Attacks on Judges - A Universal Phenomenon" ( 1998) 
72 ALJ 599 ; "Of Judicial Independence" (1986) 60 Law Institute Journal 930; "Judicial Independence 
in Australia Reaches a Moment of Truth" ( 1990) UNSWLJ I 87 . 
70 Greg Ansley "State Censures Howard and Heffernan for Kirby Affair"(20 March 2002) The New 
Zealand Herald Auckland 3. 
7 1 Hon John Doyle "The Well-Tuned Cymbal" in Helen Cunningham (ed) Fragile Bastion: Judicial 
Independence in the Nineties and Beyond (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sydney, 1997) 
39, 41. 
19 
and with the people.72 If this is so, then judges have a duty to ensure the dialogue is 
effective. 
1 Judgments 
Judgments are the principal method by which judges communicate. Published 
reasons for decisions are essential for the maintenance of an open system of justice. 
Unfortunately these reasons are often technical or obscure. Moreover they are not 
readily accessible to the non-lawyer member of the public. Kirby admits that by 
failing to provide user-friendly and public-friendly summaries, the judiciary are 
possibly bringing on "some of the confusion which they criticise so readily in 
others."73 The Family Court has addressed this problem by establishing an informative 
and easy to use website that contains summaries of selected cases.
74 In general 
however, neither judgments nor summaries are readily available to the public in New 
Zealand. Some Court of Appeal judgments may be obtained via the Internet,75 but 
decisions of other courts are only, in reality , readily accessible to those who are 
legally trained. 
2 Extra-Judicial Speech 
Judges are not prohibited from speaking outside the courtroom. It is asserted 
however, that although some Judges do speak about their role, their conversations 
have a random quality and rarely become part of a genuine public conversation. 
76 
Instead, as Levison says, they serve as "yet one more means by which "insiders" gain 
information (or sheer gossip) that is kept from the public at large."
77 This is 
undesirable. Judges should be seeking a wider audience than those politely listening 
72 See Sanford Levinson " A Dialogue with the People, or a Juricentric View of the World? Why the 
Supreme Court Should be Televised When it Announces its Opinions" 
<http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020723_ levinson.html> (last accessed 27 July 2002). 
73 Hon Justice Michael Kirby "Attacks on Judges-A Universal Phenomenon" ( 1998) 72 ALJ 599,606 . 
74 Family Court of New Zealand <http ://www.courts.govt.nz1family/ > (last accessed 28 September 
2002). 
75 Australasian Legal Information Institute <http ://www.austlii .edu .au/nzJcases/NZCA/ > (last accessed 
9 September 2002); Brookers Court of Appeal Judgments <http ://www.brookers.co.nzJlegal/judgments/ 
(last accessed 9 September 2002). 
76 Levinson, above, 3. 
77 Levinson, above, 3. 
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to speeches at law society functions and academic institutions. There are some signs 
that this is occurring. It is no longer unusual to hear judges being interviewed on the 
radio or quoted in newspapers in regard to current issues in the justice system such as 
youth crime or trial delays. This practice is to be commended and encouraged as it 
gives the community an opportunity to gain first-hand and accurate information about 
the issues in question. 
3 Annual Report of the Judiciary 
Since 1995 the Chief Justice has produced a public annual report. The report 
provides information about the structure and composition of the courts and judicial 
organisation and workloads that is not readily available elsewhere. 78 It is said to be, 
"based on the acceptance of contemporary expectations of information about the work 
undertaken by public institutions,"79 and is also seen as providing "an opportunity for 
heads of court to speak out on controversial matters occurring in the year under 
review."80 The Annual Report is an example of a user-friendly and public-friendly 
method by which information about the judiciary can be disseminated. 
4 Judicial Communications Advisor 
The judiciary employs a judicial communications advisor who reports directly 
to the heads of courts and is responsible for assisting the media to accurately report 
judicial and legal matters. This is another positive means by which the judiciary can 
ensure that court decisions are accurately reported , and mistakes, either legal or 
factual , can be corrected. Accurate media commentary about the law and its personnel 
allow for a better-informed public. This in turn allows for criticism to be made on an 
informed basis. Kirby warns however, that there are dangers for the judiciary " in 
playing the media ' s game" , as the two institutions will always have different 
purposes. Courts should not be endeavouring to cultivate public or political favour 
and moreover lack the experience and resources of the political branches of 
78 Report of the New Zealand Judicia1y 1999 <http ://www.courts .govt.nzJpublications/Judiciary-
reportl 999 .pdf> (last accessed 8 July 2002). 
79 Report of the New Zealand Judicia,y 1999, above, 2. 
80 Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum " The Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial 
Independence Revisited" ( 1997) 6 Canta L Rev 421 , 426 . 
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government. 81 Notwithstanding these limitations, and the fact that the judicial 
communications advisor is not, and should not, be seen to be a "spin doctor," the 
judiciary is making a contribution to public understanding and acceptance of the 
justice system by ensuring accurate coverage of courts' activities. 
B Judicial Appointments 
The system of judicial appointments has become more transparent in recent 
years. Consultation with a variety of organisations about appointees' suitability, and 
expressions of interest from people interested in seeking appointment, are now an 
accepted part of a system that had previously appeared to be shrouded in secrecy. This 
visibility is also said to include the attributes seen as desirable in judges, and how the 
final selection is made. 82 A more open process improves the likelihood of diversity on 
the bench. Diversity is vital to ensure continuing public confidence. While a fully 
representative judiciary may not be possible, there is likely to be greater acceptance of 
the legal system by the public if the people making the decisions reflect the 
community they serve. Additionally, diversity brings more perspectives, which leads 
to more ways of seeing things and therefore more open-mindedness. This has the 
capacity to improve decision-making in today's more complex society. 
The appointment of judges is a crucial factor in ensuring a high quality 
judiciary and is a topic in itself. In the context of this paper it suffices to state the 
obvious; that is the more successful the selection process is, the less likely judges are 
to later provide a cause for complaint. However it must be borne in mind that even the 
most rigorous appointment process will not ensure a judiciary whose members never 
behave inappropriately. This is the difference between the real judge and the ideal 
judge, and is described in this way: 83 
One of the burdens of being a judge is that one is expected to rise above mere mortal 
status and dispense justice with an objectivity that borders on the divine. Independent 
from the pressures of everyday life and free of political influences, the judge is to 
81 Hon Justice Michael Kirby "Attacks on Judges-A Universal Phenomenon" (1998) 72 ALJ 599, 606. 
82 Judge R L Young "Judicial Independence and Accountability in New Zealand" ( 1998) 45 DEC Fed 
Law 40, 44. 
83 AW MacKay "Judicial Ethics: Exploring Misconduct and Accountability for Judges" (1995) 
<http: //www.dal.ca/- cjei/mackay.html> (last accessed 9 September 2002). 
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resolve difficult legal disputes with the wisdom of a Solomon. This is the idealized 
version of the judge and is at best something to aspire to . It tends to obscure the 
human dimensions of the practical task of judging. 
The human judge is the one who is appointed to office. Public and political 
recognition of this fact is helpful in determining appropriate responses to issues of 
misconduct when they arise. 
C Judicial Education 
The Institute of Judicial Studies was established in 1998 by a memorandum of 
understanding between the Chief Justice, the Chief District Court Judge and the 
Department for Courts who provide funding and support services. The purpose of the 
Institute is to provide professional development, promote judicial excellence, and 
foster an awareness of judicial administration, developments in the law, and social 
and community issues. 84 Education programmes and publications are aimed at 
enhancing judicial work, and have included judicial orientation,
85 mentoring, and 
cultural education such as Marae visits and Te Reo seminars. Judges are said to have 
enthusiastically embraced these professional development opportunities with 
continuing judicial education now being seen as "an accepted part of the landscape of 
judicial activity. "86 
Efforts by judges to educate themselves should improve the quality of 
decisions and behaviour, and will impact positively on public confidence when the 
judiciary can be seen to be cognisant of, for example, gender and cultural issues. The 
Institute is an excellent example of a method by which the judiciary can improve the 
standard of their work whilst maintaining independence from other branches of 
government. Historically judges were resistant to " training" as being destructive of 
their individual independence, but the Institute shows that this need not be the case. 
The Institute also shows informal judicial discipline in action in the form of peer 
84 Institute of Judicial Studies Annual Report 2000-200l <http://www.courts .govt.nzJpublications/ijs 
annualreportO I .pdf > 4 (last accessed 25 September 2002). 
85 The Judicial Orientation Programme is conducted annually and includes sessions on judicial conduct, 
social context issues, courtroom management, judgment writing, sentencing, and bail. 
86 Institute of Judicial Studies Annual Report, above, 2. 
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pressure. As a now accepted part of the judicial role, it would presumably be difficult 
for an individual judge to refuse to participate. 
D Is There Room/or Improvement? 
Public misinformation and ignorance about the judiciary remains a problem. 
While the measures discussed above have gone some way towards improving the 
community's knowledge of, and confidence in the judiciary, there is still room for 
improvement in New Zealand. It is often said that we have a high quality judiciary, 
but if this is so then the public needs to hear more about it, instead of hearing only 
about things that go wrong. The average member of the public cannot be expected to 
appreciate the subtleties of constitutional conventions that prevent parliamentarians 
criticising the judiciary.87 Nor could they be expected to understand that a private 
rebuke from the Chief Justice and a promise by a misbehaving judge never to do it 
again is appropriate and effective discipline. For example, it is difficult for the public 
to appreciate the difference between the consequences for the average person of using 
a work computer to view pornography, and the consequences for a judge. The fact 
that a judge is not an employee of the government is not likely to provide a 
satisfactory explanation. 
Kirby considers that the community's lack of understanding of the judicial 
role: 88 
... may not be curable in mature adults . The remedy should start in the schools and 
through the media. It should not be confined to law faculties and learned institutes . 
Let it be a goal of the coming millennium that we re-teach the lessons of our 
constitutions and engender an informed appreciation of the judges and of their vital 
importance for the peaceful government of us all. 
The Canadian Judicial Council has embraced this proposition, by recognising that 
87 In an interview last year former Chief District Court Judge Young expressed frustration with the 
public for "misapprehending almost everything about the system." See Rosemary McLeod "Judgment 
Days" (18 March 2001) Sunday Star Times Wellington Cl. 
88 Hon Justice Michael Kirby "Attacks on Judges-A Universal Phenomenon" ( 1998) 72 ALJ 599, 607-
608. 
24 
judges have a responsibility to explain what they do and how courts operate. A 
committee examined the judicial role in public information, and encouraged judges to 
undertake educational initiatives at all levels of the education system, address 
audiences representative of their communities and engage the media constructively 
about the reporting of justice issues. This was said to be consistent with the Council's 
Ethical Principles for Judges, 89 which encourage judges to actively support the 
principle of judicial independence by taking part in activities that will foster public 
understanding and accessibility of the law and legal processes. The Council cites the 
examples of Nova Scotia and Manitoba where judges and lawyers give speeches in 
secondary schools, classes are invited to attend trials, and teachers' kits on basic 
principles of the justice system have been introduced for primary schools.90 
The New Zealand judiciary would do well to emulate these achievements. 
One-off efforts in New Zealand have been highly successful, such as a recent 
television documentary featuring a day in the life of a Family Court judge. However, 
a more concerted and continuing strategy would be required for any public education 
programme to be truly effective. Of course a considerable amount of time and 
resources would be required. Time is a major problem given a limited number of 
judges and ever-increasing workloads. Adequate funding would have to be found. 
A timely opportunity for the judiciary to reach out to the public presents itself 
with the seemingly inevitable establishment of a Judicial Commission in New 
Zealand, an objective of which is said to be the promotion of public confidence. 91 
This concept of reaching out cannot however, be confined to comfortable subject 
matter such as the operation of the justice system. Uncomfortable subjects, including 
judicial misconduct, must also be broached. 
V IMPROVING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
Judicial appointments, accountability and administration are topical subjects. 
The establishment of a Judicial Commission has been proposed, and the Attorney-
89 Canadian Judicial Council Ethical Principles for Judges < http: //www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/ethic/ 
e.pdf> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
~ Canadian Judicial Council Annual Report 1999-2000, above, 26. 
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General has also commissioned an independent review on how judges are appointed, 
removed and managed.92 This heightened scrutiny of the judiciary, by the public and 
politicians, is an inevitable development for a modern democracy that places a high 
value on the principle of open government. It is consistent with developments in 
similar jurisdictions, such as Australia and Canada. It may also in part be a 
consequence of a recent highly publicised episode of judicial misconduct. 93 
Because the transgressing judge is happily rare in New Zealand, the 
preliminary question that arises is whether there is in fact any need to improve the 
system of judicial accountability at all. Any attempt to prescribe formal procedures 
for dealing with judicial misconduct has the potential to pose an unacceptable threat 
to judicial independence. All misconduct below the threshold for removal is currently 
dealt with informally, and privately. The informal methods of discipline in current 
usage, such as the appeals system and criticism in the media, may be said to be as 
effective as it is possible to get, because it must be recognised that there are limits 
beyond which any system cannot go without compromising independence. 94 
However, judges today inhabit a different judicial landscape from that of their 
predecessors. It is arguable moreover, that part or perhaps all of the reason for the 
examples of judicial misconduct that have been seen in recent years, is that some 
judges are taking longer than others to recognise this fact, or in other words, to "get 
it." The process of "getting it" is an evolutionary one. There can be no instant 
solution. The new generation of judges who are being appointed now may be 
expected to have already "got it" vis-a-vis what modern society expects of their 
behaviour, both on and off the bench. Other judges who began their careers in 
different times may or may not take longer to "get it," but may also be expected to, 
and sooner rather than later, with the assistance of judicial education programmes. 
Furthermore, all judges are of course human, and therefore make mistakes. 
Recognition and acceptance of this fact is growing. Informed commentators praised 
the recent admission by Justice Salmon that he made an error in applying the new 
9 1 "Proposed Judicial Matters Bill" Law Talk 585 (I July 2002). 
92 Vernon Small "Judges to go Under Spotlight" (3 September 2002) New Zealand Herald Auckland I. 
93 The case of High Court Justice Fisher is discussed later in the paper. 
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sentencing legislation.95 Instead of diminishing public confidence, this has the 
potential to increase it. The public can become better informed about what is involved 
in being a judge, such as making sense of difficult legislation. 
Because continuing public confidence in the judiciary may now require a 
greater degree of accountability, thought should be given to addressing judicial 
misbehaviour that is more than minor, but below the very high threshold required for 
removal. Such behaviour will be rare, but when it occurs it has the potential to 
undermine the respect that the public has for the legal system. In the eyes of the 
community such judges are not accountable. They might quietly resign for ill health 
or other reasons, or they may not. In either case the impression of secrecy is given. 
The sole "death penalty"96 sanction of removal has an appropriately very high 
threshold, so that it will only be used in exceptional circumstances. 
A The Ministry of Justice Proposal: New South Wales Commission Model 
The Ministry of Justice is proposing to develop a Judicial Matters Bill that 
includes the establishment of a Judicial Commission based on the New South Wales 
Judicial Commission.97 The proposed Commission would be established by statute, 
comprise the heads of courts and members of the public, and consider complaints 
about all judicial officers. In appropriate cases it would report to the Attorney-General 
that Parliament consider the removal of a judge. 
1 Statutory Background 
The New South Wales Judicial Commission was established by statute in 
1987,98 as a result of allegations that a particular District Court Judge was noticeably 
lenient when sentencing offenders who were represented by a particular lawyer. 99 The 
94 Sambhav N Sankar, " Disciplining the Professional Judge" (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 1233, 1237. 
95 Catherine Masters "I got it Wrong says Judge in Hammer Case" (5 August 2002) New Zealand 
Herald Auckland I . 
96 Ed Ratushny " Speaking as Judges: How Far Can They Go?" ( 1999-2000) 11 Nat J Const Law 293 , 
311. 
97 See " Proposed Judicial Matters Bill" law Talk 585 ( I July 2002) 6. 
98 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW). 
99 Judicial Commission of New South Wales<http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/ AnnRep99/history .shtml> 
(last accessed I O September 2002). 
Commission is independent of the executive, 100and is responsible for judicial 
education, sentencing information, and the examination of complaints against judges. 
The Commission comprises six official members who are heads of benches, and four 
appointed members, one of whom is a legal practitioner, and three who are 
laypersons. 101 
2 Complaints Procedure 
Any person may complain about a judge. The complaint must be in writing, and be 
verified by statutory declaration. '02 The Commission informs the judge concerned and 
conducts a preliminary investigation, after which it will either summarily dismiss the 
complaint, 103 classify the complaint as minor, or classify the complaint as serious. 104 
A serious complaint is one, which if substantiated, could justify parliamentary 
consideration of removal from office. It must be referred to the Conduct Division, 
which comprises three judicial officers or two judicial officers and a retired judicial 
officer. '05 All other undismissed complaints are classified as "minor" and are referred 
to either the appropriate head of bench or to the Conduct Division. 
The Conduct Division investigates the complaint and may convene a hearing 
in connection with the investigation. The hearing of minor complaints is conducted 
privately while serious complaints are heard in public, although discretion exists to 
conduct private proceedings in relation to a serious complaint. '06 The Conduct 
Division is statutorily obliged to report its findings. In the case of minor complaints a 
report is made to the Commission. The outcome of a successful minor complaint will 
be counselling of the judge by his or her head of bench, or "administrative 
arrangements within his or her court that are designed to avoid a recurrence of a 
problem." 107 Where the complaint is classified as serious, a report, setting out its 
conclusions, is made to the Governor. If the complaint is wholly or partially 
100 Judicial Officers (Amendment) Act l 987(NSW). 
101 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), sS . 
102 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 17(2). 
103 For example if it is a matter more properly dealt with by appeal , or is trivial or vexatious . 
I0-1 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), sl9. 
105 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NS W), s2 l-22 . 
106 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NS W), s 24. 
107 New South Wales Judicial Commission Annual Report 2001 
<http ://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/AnnRepO 1/AR200 l .pdf> 18-19. (last accessed 19 August 2002). 
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substantiated, and the Conduct Division believes that the matter may justify 
parliamentary consideration of the removal of the judge, the report is laid before both 
Houses of Parliament. 
3 Why This is an Unsuitable Model for New Zealand 
In relation to complaints, the Commission's function is only to investigate. It 
has no power to discipline a judge. Shetreet notes that the provision for a formal 
reprimand of judges was removed from the final Act. 108 The Commission admits that 
the statutory distinction between complaints about matters that could justify 
parliamentary consideration of removal, and all other complaints, can give rise to 
misunderstandings. This is said to be because complainants will often regard the 
matter as serious even if the complaint could not be considered as justifying 
parliamentary consideration of removal of a judge. 109 
With respect, this classification fails to provide any answer to complaints 
about behaviour that may in fact be far from minor, and therefore of legitimate 
concern, but may still not justify removal from office. This is a classification that any 
New Zealand Commission would do well to avoid. It trivialises what may be a 
complainant's valid cause for concern and therefore does not have the appearance of 
taking valid complaints seriously where the conduct in question would not warrant 
removal but is clearly inappropriate or improper. 
New Zealand already has a Judicial Complaints PrOCf!SS that does, more 
informally, most of what the New South Wales Commission does with regard to 
complaints. A Commission would further formalise the complaints process and make 
it more visible and transparent, but would not in substance add to what is already in 
place. While the process that could lead ultimately to removal is clearly set out, this 
will be an extremely rare situation. The majority of complaints would be dismissed as 
being minor, and with the complainants being informed only that, although their 
concern was justified, the judge would not be removed. It is difficult to see how this 
108 See Shimon Shetreet "The Limits of Judicial Accountability: A Hard Look at the Judicial Officers 
Act 1986" (1987) 10 NNSWLJ 4, 9. 
109 Judicial Commission ofNew South Wales Annual Report 2001, above, 19. 
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would enhance public confidence. Such a procedure may even have the effect of 
diminishing public respect in the judiciary, as the community may perceive a group of 
judges merely letting other judges off. Clipping the wings of an institution in this way 
ensures it will have only a limited role, and could be criticised as being mere window 
dressing. 
B The Canadian Judicial Council and "Expressions of Disapproval:" A Better 
Model/or New Zealand 
1 Statutory Background 
The Canadian Judicial Council (the Council) was established in 1971 by 
amendments to the Judges Act. 110 It consists of the chief justices and associate chief 
justices, chief judges and associate chief judges of all courts whose members are 
appointed by the federal government. 111 
The statutory objects of the Council are to "promote efficiency and uniformity, 
and to improve the quality of judicial service in superior courts and in the Tax Court 
of Canada." 112 The Council's work involves the continuing education of judges, 
developing consensus among Council members on issues involving the administration 
of justice, making recommendations on judicial salaries and benefits, and handling 
complaints against federally appointed judges. 113 The Judges Act and Council By-
laws set up a procedure that may end in a recommendation from the Council to the 
Minister of Justice that a judge be removed from office.114 As in New Zealand actual 
removal would be accomplished by an address of Parliament. The Council's role is to 
investigate complaints or allegations as a preliminary stage before removal upon an 
address of Parliament. 
11 0 1985 RS CJ I. 
111 This makes for a total membership of 39. The number of federally appointed judges was 1029 as of 
January 2002 . See the Canadian Judicial Council <http:// www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/about_cjc.htm> 
(last accessed 20 July 2002). 
11 2 Judges Act RS 1985 CJ I, s60( I). 
11 3 Federally appointed judges are those of the equivalent of the High Court and Court of Appeal of the 
provinces, and the judges of the Tax Court of Canada, Federal Court of Canada, and Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
11 4 Judges Act 1985 RS CJ I, s 65(2). 
2 Complaints Procedure 
There are two ways in which the inquiry process may be initiated. The Council 
must undertake a formal inquiry into a judge's conduct if requested to do so by the 
Minister of Justice of Canada or by a provincial Attorney-General. 115 Otherwise the 
Council has a discretion to investigate any complaint or allegation made in respect of 
a federally appointed judge. 116 This, in practice, is the usual route, as most complaints 
come from members of the public. 
The early stages of the process are governed by the Council By-Laws. 117 
Every complaint received by the Council is referred to the Executive 
Director. 118Complaints must be in writing and refer to the conduct of a judge subject 
to the Act. 119 Council members are also required to, in effect, initiate a complaint 
themselves in situations where they believe the conduct of a judge may require the 
attention of the council. 120 The Executive Director sends a copy of the complaint to 
the Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee for review. 121 The Chairperson 
reviews each complaint and decides if any further action is required. The judge and 
the judge's chief justice may be asked for their comments, or the Chairperson may 
make further inquiries. 122 The Chairperson may then close the file and advise the 
complainant with an appropriate reply if the matter is trivial, vexatious or without 
substance, 123 or if the conduct of the judge is inappropriate or improper but the matter 
is not serious enough to warrant removal. 124 If the judge recognises that his or her 
conduct is inappropriate or improper, the Chairperson who closes the file may express 
disapproval of the judge's conduct. 125 
11 5 Judges Act RS 1985 CJ I, s 63( I). 
116 Judges Act RS 1985 CJ I, s 63(2) . 
11 7 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws <http: //www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/bylaws.htm> (last accessed 
2 September 2002). Section 6 I (3) of the Judges Act authorises the Council to make by-laws in respect 
of the conduct of inquiries . 
11 8 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 45 . 
11 9 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 43 . 
12° Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 44(1). 
12 1 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 45. 
122 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, ss 47-48. 
123 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 50(l)(a). The Council notes that by far the largest proportion 
of complaints are without foundation and are dealt with in this way. 
124 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 50( I )(b ). 
125Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 50(2). 
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If the Chairperson does not close the file, it is referred to a Panel of up to five 
members of the Council for further review. The Panel would comprise of Chief 
Justices of courts other than that of the judge who is the subject of the complaint. 126 
The Panel may close the file on the same basis as the Chairperson, although they may 
express disapproval of the judge ' s conduct, whether or not the judge has 
acknowledged its impropriety. 127 Otherwise they may recommend to the Council that 
a formal inquiry be undertaken pursuant to section 63(2) of the Judges Act. 128 The 
Council then considers the Panel's report and any written submissions received by the 
judge. It may decide that no formal inquiry should be undertaken because the matter 
is not serious enough to warrant removal. The Council would then advise the 
complainant and the judge, including an expression of disapproval of the judge's 
conduct if the circumstances required. 129 Or the Council may decide that an 
investigation be held because the matter is serious enough to warrant removal. 130The 
Inquiry Committee reports its findings to the Council , including its opinion on 
whether the Council should recommend removal of the judge from office. Finally the 
Council is required to review the report of the Inquiry Committee and report its 
conclusions to the Minister of Justice under section 65 of the Judges Act. 131 
3 "Expressions of Disapproval" 
As in New Zealand and New South Wales, the only legal sanction for 
misconduct by a superior court judge in Canada is removal from office following an 
address of Parliament. Notwithstanding that the plain words of the Judges Act do not 
give the Council any disciplinary powers, the Council has said that it, "accepts a duty 
to explain its thinking. In this context there may be an expression of disapproval or 
criticism of the behaviour that prompted the complaint." 132 This practice has been 
recognised in the Council By-Laws since 1998. It has been justified in a legal opinion 
to the Council which draws a distinction between a reprimand being a formal sanction 
126 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, ss53-54. 
127 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s55( 1 )(a). 
128 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 59. 
129 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 59(a). 
13° Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 59(b). 
131 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, s 71. 
132 Canadian Judicial Council Annual Report 1992- /993 < http ://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/ 
annual_ reports. htm> I 0. 
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requmng statutory authority, and an express10n of disapproval which is a 
characterisation of the judges conduct conveyed to the judge and to the 
complainant. 133 In other words, after a Panel has investigated a complaint and 
concluded that the judge's behaviour was inappropriate, it reports its finding to the 
judge and to the complainant. 
The statutory objects of the Council support this practice, as does the public 
interest in having complaints taken seriously. This is because, as Russell has pointed 
out: 134 
Society is inadequately protected from judicial misconduct if the removal process is 
the only way of sanctioning judges ... If a judiciary is to be reasonably accountable to 
the public it serves, there must be ways and means of responding to complaints other 
than the "death penalty" of removal. 
Furthermore, as Friedland's study of the Canadian Judiciary noted, "[i]n most cases, 
the matter will have already been public and the failure to comment publicly on the 
conduct would create even more undesirable adverse comment about the judiciary."135 
Thus expressions of disapproval are a pragmatic approach to the issue of judicial 
misconduct. Otherwise, as Ratushny says, "complainants with justified (but not of 
"death penalty" magnitude) concerns would simply have to be informed that removal 
was not warranted."136 This seems to be precisely the problem with the new South 
Wales approach. 
It can be noted however, that the words of the New South Wales Act do not 
rule out the ability of their Judicial Commission to express disapproval of a judge's 
conduct that has been the subject of a complaint. Section 27 instructs the 
133 See Martin L Friedland A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada 
(Canadian Judicial Council, Ottowa, 1995) 95, citing D M Goldie "Legal Opinion for the Judicial 
Conduct Committee" (23 March 1990) and lei/er of John J Robinette to Associate Chief Justice 
MacKinnon (27 April 1982) printed in "Case Report: Report and Record of the Committee of 
Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon Mr Justice Berger and Resolution of the Canadian Judicial 
Councif' [1983) 28 McGill LJ 379, 434-436. 
134 PH Russell The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (McGraw-Hill Ryerson 
Ltd, Toronto, 1987) 3-4. 
135 Friedland, above, 139. 
136 Ed Ratushny "Speaking as Judges: How Far Can They Go?" (1999-2000) Nat J Const Law 293, 
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Commission, in regard to substantiated minor complaints, to either inform the judicial 
officer involved or to decide that no action need be taken. 137 If the New South Wales 
Commission accepted a duty to explain its reasoning in the way the Canadian Judicial 
Council has, it could presumably characterise the judge's conduct as unacceptable, 
even though it did not warrant consideration of removal from office. 
Whether an expression of disapproval is characterised as a reprimand or as an 
explanation of Council reasoning, it must operate as a serious sanction in a profession 
where reputation and respect are highly valued. Accordingly the Council uses this 
power in a circumspect manner. The By-Laws have been drafted in a manner that 
restricts their use. At the initial stages of the complaints procedure the Chairperson of 
the Judicial Conduct Committee may only express disapproval if the judge recognises 
that his or her conduct is inappropriate or improper. Otherwise the expression of 
disapproval must come from a Panel consisting of three or five members. As 
Ratushny explains there will have been a number of meetings, a review of the 
complaint and the response of the judge and his or her chief judge, together with the 
results of any further inquiries that were undertaken. 138 Friedland, who inspected the 
Council's complaints files, confirmed this careful approach, stating that the use of 
such public criticisms is "never taken lightly." 139 
The Canadian Judicial Council has expressed its disapproval of judges' 
conduct sparingly and, for the most part, effectively over the past twenty years. The 
following examples illustrate the evolution of this mechanism from the "growing 
pains" of the Berger affair to a recent case that shows an expression of disapproval as 
a constructive approach to judicial discipline. 
137 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s27. 
138 Ratushny, above, 314. 
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4 Disapproval in Action: 20 years of Canadian Experience 
(a) Justice Berger 
In 1982, after a complaint from a judge, the Council strongly criticised 
Supreme Court of British Columbia Justice Berger for his outspoken comments 
regarding the omission of Aboriginal rights protection, and a veto for Quebec in the 
Constitutional Agreement reached in 1981 . 140 
By today's standards, this response, though short of removal , was indeed 
harsh, and probably wrong. Justice Berger was commenting on a broad social issue 
that today would probably be seen as crucial. Given his extensive track record on 
Aboriginal rights, his public statement did not reveal anything that was not already 
known about his views. Furthermore Justice Berger did not accept that the Council 
had any jurisdiction to reprimand him. He resigned a year later. 
The Berger affair provides a valuable lesson in the pitfalls of an intermediate 
sanction beneath removal from office. If the subject of the complaint does not accept 
that he or she has transgressed, and in this case , even the jurisdiction of the 
disciplinary body to issue a reprimand, then the whole process becomes damaging for 
the judiciary. In this case the Judicial Council appeared to have been pressured into 
applying the formal investigative machinery by the Prime Minister of the time who 
was highly critical of the judge' s comments and expressed the hope that the judiciary 
would "do something about it. " 141 Therefore, the problem with the Berger case was 
not so much that the Council criticised a judge, but that the criticism of this judge at 
this time was inappropriate, especially in the context of the significant constitutional 
change that was occurring in Canada. 
139 Martin L Friedland A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Canadian 
Judicial Council , Ottowa, 1995) 139. 
14° Case Report Report and Record oft he Committee of Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr 
Justice Berger and Resolution of the Canadian Judicial Council [1983) 28 McGill LJ 378. 
14 1 See Friedland, above, 98-102 . 
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(b) The Donald Marshall Jr Reference 
The Marshall controversy arose from comments made by the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal in a judgment quashing the murder conviction of Donald Marshall Jr 
who had spent over 10 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. In essence the 
court blamed him for being the author of his own misfortune. A Royal Commission 
appointed to investigate the wrongful conviction was highly critical of the 
performance of the Court and the wording of its judgment in acquitting Marshall. One 
result of this criticism was a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council and the 
formation of an Inquiry Committee, which unofficially reprimanded the Appeal Court 
judges, but did not call for their removal from the bench. 142 
The Inquiry Committee report is an important precedent in the jurisprudence 
of the Council. It established the test for removal, applied it to judicial speech in 
reasons for judgment, and strongly expressed disapproval of conduct in circumstances 
where it was improper but did not warrant removal. Reactions were mixed. Some said 
that it was no more than "wrist slapping," and that the Inquiry Committee must have 
highly offended the judges who were criticised, and would be seen as traitors in the 
world of judicial etiquette. 143 Others said this was bold criticism that contributed to 
instilling public confidence in the judiciary. 144 MacKay, who has written extensively 
on this subject, saw a great improvement in the way the Council had conducted the 
inquiry, by holding public hearings, delegation to a committee that included two non-
judicial members and the establishment of a fair process for all. 145 The reaction of 
Donald Marshall Jr himself is most telling. He had, through counsel, taken the 
position that he did not want the Council to recommend removal of the judges from 
office, provided they could be censured. He also commented publicly after the report 
142 Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant to 
Subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia (Canadian 
Judicial Council, August 1990). 
143 ME Turpel, "The Judged and the Judging: Locating Innocence in a Fallen Legal World" (1991) 40 
UNBLJ 281, 286. 
144 AW MacKay "Judicial Free Speech and Accountability: Should Judges Be Seen and Not Heard?" 
(1993) 3 Nat J Const Law 159, 204-205. 
145 MacKay, above, 206-207. 
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was released, stating that he was pleased with the harsh criticism the judges 
received. 146 
(c) Justice Barakett 
It is said that, "if the [Marshall] Report was a treacherous aberration in the 
judicial world in 1990, it has certainly established an approach for dealing with 
judicial conduct by the Canadian Judicial Council that must now be accepted as 
'mainstream' ." 147 The recent expression of disapproval of Superior Court of Quebec 
Justice Barakett's conduct illustrates this proposition nicely. 
Justice Barakett was the subject of a complaint over comments he made in the 
course of custody proceedings that were derogatory to Aboriginal culture. 148 The 
Panel found his conduct, while improper, was not serious enough to warrant removal. 
Material to this decision was the expression of remorse from the judge, including a 
public letter of apology in which he said he recognised that his comments had been 
disparaging and apologised for the hurt they caused. 149 His willingness to enrol in 
training courses to improve his understanding of aboriginal culture, and the finding 
that the comments did not affect the outcome of the case in which they were made 
were also factors considered by the Council. The Council said there was no evidence 
of malice and therefore the public could be expected to have confidence "that you 
have learned from this experience ... " 150 
The Panel's letter to the judge pointed out that the conduct proceedings were 
at a remedial rather than punitive stage. Therefore if it could be demonstrated to the 
complainant that the complaint was addressed, if the judge was capable of learning 
from his or her misconduct and avoiding it in future, and if the public can maintain 
146 Ed Ratushny " Speaking as Judges: How Far Can They Go?" (1999-2000) Nat J Const Law 293 , 
336. 
147 Ratushny, above, 334-335. 
148 Canadian Judicial Council Media Releases "Panel Disapproves of Conduct of Mr Justice Barakett" 
(26 July 2002) <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/news _ releases/2002 _ 07 _ 26.htm> (last accessed 20 
September 2002). 
149 Letter of Hon Mr F G Barakett to Canadian Judicial Council Canadian Judicial Council (3 July 
2002)<http :// www .cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/news_releases/2002_07 _26%20attach I %20attach .htm> (last 
accessed 20 September 2002). 
150Letter of Canadian Judicial Council to Hon Mr F G Barakett (24 July 2002) Canadian Judicial 
Council <http: //www. cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/news_releases/2002_07 _26%20attach I .htm> (last 
accessed 20 September 2002). 
confidence that complaints about judicial conduct are taken seriously, then the 
removal of a judge may be neither necessary nor desirable. Because of publicity 
surrounding the complainants' letters to the Council, the Council authorised public 
release of its letter to the judge. 
While this complaint was under consideration by the Panel, the Council 
received a second complaint about the judge involving comments he had made in 
another custody hearing. The Vice-Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee 
dealt with this complaint by expressing disapproval of the judge's comments in a 
separate letter to the judge, which the Council also made public. 151 
5 Do "Expressions of Disapproval " Undermine Judicial Independence? 
The Council admits that the complaints process "inevitably risks exposing 
judges to unjust accusations and unwarranted public questioning of their character." 152 
This is particularly so when the complaint is made public but is later found to be 
unjustified, since the finding will inevitably not receive the publicity that the original 
accusation did, and judges cannot refute such accusations publicly. However the 
Council says this merely "underscores the importance of providing a process that 
respects judicial independence but is also fair and equitable." 153 This is to be achieved 
by giving complainants an opportunity to have their concerns reviewed, while 
assuring a prompt and fair resolution for the subject of the complaint. The complaint 
can only be made public by the complainant. In such a case the council will generally 
issue a news release when closing the file . 154 
Because expressions of disapproval have developed from within the judiciary 
and do not involve the other branches of government, the loss of overall judicial 
independence is minimised. There is however, a loss of judges' internal independence 
resulting from this disciplinary mechanism, as individual judges are subject to their 
151 l etter of Canadian Judicial Council to Hon Mr F C Barakett (24 July 2002) Canadian Judicial 
Counci I <http: //www. cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/news _ releases/2002 _ 07 _ 26%20attach2.htm> 
(last accessed 20 September 2002). 
152 Canadian Judicial Council Annual Report 2000-200/<http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/ 
annual_reports/2000-200 l _ E.pdf> (last accessed 20 September 2002) I 0. 
153 Canadian Judicial Council Annual Report 2000-2001, above, I 0. 
154 Canadian Judicial Council Annual Report 2000-2001 , above, 10. 
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conduct being criticised by other judges. But since judicial independence exists to 
ensure public confidence in a legal system that requires voluntary compliance with 
decisions, this modest loss of independence by the individual judge is a fair sacrifice 
to make, if public confidence in the judiciary as a whole is enhanced. The acceptance 
of expressions of disapproval by the Judiciary in Canada may be owed to the fact that 
they have evolved from the Judiciary, rather than being imposed by statute, as well as 
the restrained manner in which they have generally been used. 
It is beyond question that it is desirable to have an appeal system to correct 
legal error. It is equally important to have processes of accountability that may deter 
or expose the judge who makes rude, insensitive, racist or sexist remarks, or who 
engages in conduct off the bench that may threaten the legitimacy of the judiciary as a 
whole. Arguments have been made that Judicial Commissions and complaints 
procedures are undesirable because they introduce hierarchical patterns into the 
judiciary. 155 Such arguments fail to recognise that the judiciary is intensely 
hierarchical by its very nature. The judiciary operates on the basis that judges will 
respect the judgements of their peers, adhere to precedent and accept orders from 
superior courts. This is very important to the maintenance of a fair justice system, 
since other branches of government cannot review a judge's decision in a case. As 
Sankar puts it, "The popularly imagined independent judge is slavishly deferent to his 
superiors because the judicial monopoly on legal decision making presupposes his 
hierarchical behaviour." 156 
In any case the benefits of having an expression of disapproval as part of the 
system of judicial accountability outweigh a small loss of individual judicial 
independence. The public is reassured that troubling judicial behaviour is taken 
seriously, and the response of a Judicial Commission provides guidance for future 
situations. This may have the ability to lessen suspicion and scrutiny of the judiciary 
from the public and from the other branches of government since there is less to be 
suspicious of when it is known in advance what sort of behaviour is unacceptable and 
how it will be dealt with. Therefore greater judicial accountability may lead to greater 
155 Shimon Shetreet "The Limits of Judicial Accountability: A Hard Look at the Judicial Officers Act 
1986" (1987) 10 UNSWLJ 4, 11. 
156 Sambhav N Sankar "Disciplining the Professional Judge" (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 1233, 1240. 
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judicial independence, which benefits not only the judiciary, but also the community 
and the rule of law itself. 
The remedial rather than punitive function of an expression of disapproval 
ensures that the judge can learn from the mistake and reduce the likelihood of 
recurrence of the behaviour that was the subject of the complaint. As the case of 
Justice Barakett showed, the fact that he acknowledged the inappropriateness of his 
conduct and apologised had a bearing on the outcome. In other words he "got it." This 
is in contrast to the position taken by the judges in the Marshall case who felt their 
comments were completely justified. The fact that they did not "get it" is said to be 
part of the reason that the council so strongly disapproved of the conduct. If they had 
acknowledged their insensitivity and expressed regret, Ratushny says it is doubtful 
that removal would have even been considered, and the expression of disapproval 
might have been less severe. 157 
C Expressing Disapproval of New Zealand Judges 
With the high likelihood of the establishment of a Judicial Commission in 
New Zealand in the near future, expressions of disapproval could be incorporated into 
the complaints system that will be a part of a Commission's function . Thought would 
need to be given to the composition of a complaints committee. There is no reason 
why it must be comprised solely or predominantly of chief judges as in Canada. In 
this respect the New South Wales Commission is the preferable model as members 
include laypersons and can include retired judges. The addition of non-judicial 
members is very important for public confidence and is already part of the present 
complaints system. Lessening the numbers of chief judges involved in the complaints 
process is also desirable to meet concerns that undesirable hierarchical patterns will 
be introduced into the judiciary. 158Friedland suggested, in the Canadian context, that it 
would be desirable to involve puisne judges, in order to give them a greater stake in 
157 Ed Ratushny "Speaking as Judges: How Far Can They Go?" (1999-2000) Nat J Const Law 293, 
338. 
158See Shimon Shetreet "The Limits of Judicial Accountability: A Hard Look at the Judicial Officers 
Act 1986" (I 987) I O UNSWLJ 4; and Hon Mr Justice M H Mclelland " Disciplining Australian 
Judges" (1990) 64 ALJ 388. 
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the discipline process, and to ensure it is not solely the chief justices who are making 
the decisions. 159 
An important question arises as to whether expressions of disapproval should 
be formally provided for by legislation, or whether the Canadian approach should be 
taken, whereby a Judicial Commission would establish the practice pursuant to 
by laws, the making of which is authorised by the empowering Act. The beauty of the 
Canadian approach is that it is pragmatic. There is no need for argument about the 
constitutionality or not of reprimanding judges. Instead of being a procedure foisted 
on the judiciary by other branches of government, it is a natural result of a complaints 
procedure in which an investigation takes place and the reasons are stated. This sort of 
pragmatism fits neatly with New Zealand constitutional practice. Moreover, judges 
may be more likely to accept the existence of expressions of disapproval, as the 
reasoning of a judicial commission who has investigated a complaint, than they would 
a formal reprimand imposed by statute. 160 
Three examples of judicial misconduct in New Zealand within the last ten 
years illustrate how the practice of expressing disapproval of a judge's conduct could 
have provided a better response to these situations, both from the point of view of the 
community and of the judiciary. 
1 Judge Beattie 
District Court Judge Martin Beattie was one of two judges who were charged 
with intent to defraud in respect of travel expense claims. The other judge pleaded 
guilty and resigned. Judge Beattie pleaded not guilty and successfully defended the 
charges. When the judge wished to resume judicial work the Minister of Justice 
sought the opinion of the Solicitor-General on whether he could commence 
159 Martin L Friedland A Place Apart: Judicial independence and Accountability in Canada (Canadian 
Judicial Council, Ottowa, I 995) 138. 
160 See Shetreet, above, 9, where he notes that the provision for a formal reprimand of judges was 
removed from the final Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW). 
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proceedings for the judge's removal under section 7 of the District Courts Act on the 
d f · b h · 161 groun s o m1s e av10ur. 
The Solicitor-General determined that "misbehaviour" was, "conduct that is so 
morally wrong and improper that it demonstrates a judge lacks the integrity to 
continue to exercise judicial office." 162 A broader interpretation was rejected because 
of the constitutional requirement that the power of removal be limited so as to protect 
the judiciary from executive interference. Accordingly a mere failure to be above 
suspicion was not enough. The Solicitor-General rejected a test of public confidence 
in the administration of justice as a benchmark of judicial misconduct. The end result 
was that, in the Solicitor-General's opinion, the Minister could not recommend 
removal, as the statutory grounds were not made out given the previous criminal 
acquittal. 
This finding was criticised. Joseph said that, "the power to remove a judge is 
necessary for preserving public confidence in the administration of justice and this 
need offsets the value of judicial independence." 163 While this is true, a public 
confidence test without more too closely ties removal to current public opinion. 
Additionally the public may be too easily offended by any judicial misconduct at all, 
especially if the full facts and constitutional issues involved are not known or 
understood. The Canadian test for removal as established by the Marshall Inquiry 
Committee is a test of public confidence but with a very high threshold. The question 
to be asked is: 164 
Is the conduct alleged so manifestly and profoundly destructive of the concept of the 
impartiality, integrity and independence of the judicial role, that public confidence 
would be sufficiently undermined to render the judge incapable of executing the 
judicial office? 
16 1 J J McGrath Opinion to the Minister of Justice, Hon Doug Graham, on whether Proceedings might 
be Instituted under S7 of the District Courts Act 19./7 to Remove Judge Beattie from the Bench, I 
September 1997 cited in Philip Joseph "Constitutional Law" [I 998] NZ Law Rev 198,200. 
162 McGrath , above, para 4. 
163 Philip Joseph "Constitutional Law" [ 1998] NZ Law Rev I 98, 200. 
164 Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Jnqui1y Committee Established Pursuant to 
Subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia (Canadian 
Judicial Council, August I 990) 27. 
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Even this test of public confidence may not have been satisfied here. Although the 
judge's behaviour could be said to have been destructive of the concept of judicial 
integrity, it could not necessarily also be said to have been destructive of impartiality 
and independence. 
Accepting the Solicitor-General's finding that the Minister could not 
recommend removal, it would have then been an ideal case for a public expression of 
disapproval of the judge's conduct from an appropriate body. The Judge acted 
improperly. He had admitted as much, but said he had acted honestly in the genuine, 
if mistaken, belief that he was entitled to make the overnight allowance claims. The 
jury must have had a reasonable doubt that there was dishonest intent, and their 
finding must be respected. But the fact remained that the judge made overnight travel 
claims when he stayed at home. At the very least this behaviour raises questions of 
ethics. A public expression of disapproval of the judge's behaviour would have 
assured the community that the judiciary did not approve of such behaviour. Coupled 
with an explanation of why judges must be very difficult to remove from office, it 
would also have served a valuable educative purpose. 
In reality it seems that informal discipline took over, as the Chief District 
Court Judge, by a "coincidental" 165 amendment to the District Courts Act, was 
empowered to direct in which jurisdiction a judge should sit. Judge Beattie was, 
arguably, relegated to the Accident Compensation Review bench and has never sat in 
open court again. It was also rumoured that his brother and sister judges shunned him. 
But this does not represent a principled approach to matters of judicial accountability, 
being instead an ad hoe method of ensuring what must have been thought by the 
judiciary to be the just and desirable outcome. The public was merely left to speculate 
as to whether Judge Beattie's fate was the Judiciary's idea of punishment. 
2 Justice Morris 
Justice Morris caused a public outcry when, during the course of summing up 
in a rape trial, he said that, " ... if every man throughout history had stopped the first 
165 R L Young "Judicial Independence and Accountability in New Zealand" 45-DEC Fed Law 40, 46. 
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time a woman said no, the world would be a far less exciting place." 166 While it was 
pointed out that the statement is less egregious when understood in the context of the 
particular trial, it nevertheless remains clearly unacceptable. The Chief Justice 
unusually, and publicly, commented that the judge's remarks were inappropriate. He 
later said, "the public is entitled to expect the highest standards from judges, and this 
kind of event is damaging to confidence in the judiciary." 167 
This is, in effect, an expression of disapproval in practice in New Zealand. A 
public censure by the Chief Justice informs the community that the judiciary does not 
approve of such behaviour. This appropriate response would have been further 
strengthened had it come from . an official body such as a Judicial Commission. 
Additionally, since an expression of disapproval serves a remedial function, a 
response from the transgressing judge would have reassured the public that such 
behaviour would not be repeated. 
3 Justice Fisher 
When, earlier this year, the Prime Minister said that High Court Justice Robert 
Fisher's use of the Internet to access pornography raised issues of personal judgment 
and the monitoring of judges behaviour, she was undoubtedly correct. 168 She was also 
undoubtedly breaching the constitutional convention that politicians do not pass 
comment on the judiciary. Six years previously, when Justice Morris made his now 
infamous remarks, the Minister of Justice had declined to comment for this very 
reason. The convention is, as Joseph puts it, "codified" 169 in the Cabinet Manual, 
which states that: 170 
Ministers should not express any views that are likely to be publicised where they 
could be regarded as reflecting adversely on the impartiality, personal views or 
ability of any judge. 
166 Wendy Murdoch "Judiciary Deals With Controversy" (3 July 1996) Evening Post Wellington I . 
167 Murdoch, above, I. 
168 See, for example, "Cabinet to Discuss Sex-Site Judge" (18 February 2002) The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland 3. 
169 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) 303. 
17° Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, 2001) 
para 2.115. 
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As some media commentators pointed out, the correct response from the Prime 
Minister would have been a statement to the effect that, since the Chief Justice had 
dealt with the matter as she saw fit, it would be improper to comment further. 171 
The Chief Justice had dealt with the matter more than a year previously by 
reprimanding the judge. Fisher J is understood to have acknowledged his actions were 
inappropriate, and apologised, with an undertaking not to engage in such behaviour in 
future. When the incident came to light the government sought a Crown Law Office 
opinion on whether or not the judge could be removed. After the report concluded 
there was nothing illegal in Fisher J's actions, the government stepped back from the 
affair. Although there were some calls for his resignation, from the public and from 
politicians, the judge did not resign. 
This is precisely the type of situation where an expression of disapproval of 
the judge's conduct by an independent judicial body would have been appropriate and 
desirable. While informal discipline was meted out to the judge in private, a more 
formal censure would have assured the public that the judiciary expects higher 
standards of its members than the standard of the judge's conduct on this occasion. It 
may also have discouraged damaging political comment, as there would have been 
little for politicians to usefully add. The public would have had the opportunity of 
learning why the judge could not and should not be removed, while being assured that 
although he had transgressed, he could properly continue in his judicial role, since he 
had had the opportunity of learning from his mistake. 
D Judicial Code of Conduct 
The imposition of a sanction other than removal makes the formulation of an 
express standard of conduct essential. Judges who may face a variety of penalties 
deserve to know the types of behaviour that could result in sanctions. Codes of 
Conduct provide this type of information. They act as a guide about what is and is not 
acceptable behaviour. If judges engage in improper behaviour, they cannot claim to be 
171 Editorial: Political Action on Judge Disturbing (19 February 2002) The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland 2. 
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unaware their behaviour is inappropriate if the standards are expressly set out in a 
code. Thus a code of conduct is a mechanism for preventing unacceptable behaviour, 
since it may be more difficult in an increasingly complex society for the individual 
judge to identify and define the standard of behaviour to which he or she should 
adhere. Thomas indicates that one of the challenges that judicial ethics faces is the 
lack of a forum for discussion: 172 
In the absence of known criteria, one tends to approach questions of conduct from a 
personal standpoint. Perhaps judges hesitate to discuss this topic because discussion 
may invite scrutiny of the judge's own conduct, values and taste; and there is grave 
danger of treading on the sensitivity of other judges. 
Judges, especially in smaller centres, may work in relative isolation and thus lack the 
opportunity to regularly communicate with their peers. This prevents the exchange of 
experience, information and guidance. Unwritten conventions that may have governed 
in the past may not be as easy for the more diverse and numerous judges of today to 
access. The development and implementation of a judicial code of conduct could 
provide an opportunity for discussion within the judiciary, without individual judges 
feeling they are under attack. 
A judicial code of conduct also provides a standard against which to assess 
judicial behaviour. The public benefits from gaining an understanding of the high 
ethical standards to which a judge is held. Educating the community about the role of 
judges and making judges accountable for their conduct are enhanced as vital aspects 
of maintaining public respect for the judiciary. By following ethical guidelines a 
judge ' s behaviour is more likely to accord with what the public expect of a judge. 
This can only increase public confidence . Having standards by which to measure 
judicial behaviour shows the public whether or not the judges are achieving these 
standards. 
The argument can be made that codes of conduct interfere with judicial 
independence. A more constructive view is that the judiciary itself most appropriately 
formulates a code of conduct, and it is not a legislative document imposed on them. It 
172 Hon Justice Thomas AM Judicial Ethics in Australia (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1988) 5. 
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has been suggested that "guidelines" may be a better description than "code," which 
h · · · 173 as prescnptlve connotations. 
Whether the term code or guidelines or principles is used, the establishment of 
a judicial code of conduct must be seen as inevitable. A United Nations draft 
international code has been formulated by a high level judicial group drawing on 
codes that have already been adopted in many parts of the world. 174 This has been 
done in the hope that it will "stimulate those countries that have not yet adopted such 
an approach. " 175 The international code is expected to be highly influential, although 
it may take a decade or more before the process of consideration by various 
jurisdictions is completed and the final code is recommended to the United Nations. 176 
Formulation of a code of conduct would be a natural activity for the proposed 
Judicial Commission in New Zealand. Canada again provides a worthy example for 
the New Zealand judiciary to follow. The Canadian Judicial Council published 
Ethical Principles for Judges in 1998. 177 Furthermore the Council agreed at the same 
time to the establishment of an Advisory Committee to offer advice to judges seeking 
assistance in applying the Principles to specific problems. Therefore the Principles 
not only offer general guidance to judges, but also a mechanism that may prevent 
judicial misconduct by steering judges away from potentially controversial situations. 
E Changing the Convention 
This paper has advocated criticism of judicial misconduct by the judiciary. But 
is there any role for the other branches of government? The public expects leadership 
from their elected representatives when matters of public concern such as the integrity 
of the judiciary arise. Furthermore it seems odd if an example of judicial misconduct 
is in the public arena, and the media may comment, but the elected representatives 
may not. It has been noted above that sometimes the convention proscribing executive 
173 Hon John Doyle "Judicial Standards" Contemporary Constraints on Judges - The Australian 
Experience" (200 I) 75 ALJ 96, I 04. 
174 See Hon Justice Michael Kirby " A Global Approach to Judicial Independence and Integrity" (200 I) 
21 UQLJ 147, 150-159. 
175 Kirby, above, 149. 
176 Kirby, above, 148. 
177Canadian Judicial Council Ethical Principles for Judges < http: //www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/ethic/ 
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comment on the judiciary is ignored, with the result that public confidence in the 
judiciary may be damaged. There may also be times when the convention is ignored 
but no real damage is caused. There is a difference between abuse and criticism. No 
one would argue that politicians are unable to comment generally on matters 
involving the judiciary; therefore it may fairly be argued that the convention as 
presently understood may be too wide. 178 
The convention relating to the need for Ministers to respect judicial integrity 
and independence is one of a number of conventions that "find their way" into the 
Cabinet Manual mainly because they are not written out elsewhere, besides 
constitutional textbooks. 179 In the same way as the 2001 Cabinet Manual recognised 
and declared the new form of the convention relating to collective responsibility after 
the Labour-Alliance coalition agreement included an "agree to disagree" process, 180 it 
could recognise a change in the convention relating to Ministerial comment on the 
judiciary. A change could allow Ministers to comment on matters of public concern 
that relate to the judiciary, including judicial misconduct. This is precisely what the 
Prime Minister did in relation to Justice Fisher, and it could be suggested that if the 
Executive does not consider itself bound by this convention, then it may have already 
changed. 
Although superficially there appears to be nothing wrong with changing this 
convention, comment about the judicial branch from the political branches remains 
problematic. This is, to a large extent, because such comment is likely to be made in 
time for the evening news instead of being made once all the facts are ascertained. 
The Fisher case clearly illustrates the problems. For example, as soon as Justice 
Fisher's activities became public, Ministerial comments about the judge were quickly 
made. And as the media reported, "not to be outdone, the Opposition ... called for 
Justice Fisher's suspension ... " 181 Then utter silence followed after a report concluded 
e.pdf> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
n8 See Andrew P Stockley "Judicial Independence: The New Zealand Experience" (1997) 3 Aust J 
Legal Hist 145, 168-169. 
179 Elizabeth Mcleay "What is the Constitutional Status of the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual?" 
(1999) 10 Public Law Rev 11, 12. 
180 See Duncan Ferrier Collective Responsibility and the Cabinet Manual: New Zealand "Recognises 
and Declares" a Change (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001). 
181 Tracy Watkins "Three More Judges in Net Sex Scandal" (19 February 2002) The Dominion 
Wellington I. 
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that the judge's behaviour would not warrant removal from office. This is confusing 
for the public. It further damages public confidence in the judiciary, as the public has 
heard criticism of a judge's behaviour from the political branches of government, 
silence from the judiciary, and no action that appears to have been taken in relation to 
the misconduct. 
As this case shows, once a comment emanates from the government, the 
opposition also feels the need to speak out. This has the potential to become an 
unedifying spectacle in the MMP environment, if the many opposition parties, all of 
which are seeking to differentiate themselves from the government and from each 
other, add their opinions. Likewise at election time, when the law and order debate 
inevitably rears its head, the judiciary becomes an easy target for politicians keen to 
increase their share of media coverage. 
If the Executive feels the need to speak out about judges, because it is an issue 
of public importance that judges are not being held accountable for inappropriate 
behaviour, then the solution is to improve the system of judicial accountability and 
not to relax the convention. Adverse comments about an individual judge have the 
potential to undermine that judge's ability to continue in office and have a detrimental 
effect on the judiciary as a whole. Because judicial independence from the other 
branches of government is such a fundamental principle of New Zealand's 
constitution and of the rule of law itself, it is a principle that should not be eroded. 
VI CONCLUSION 
We expect our judges to be almost superhuman in wisdom , in propriety, in decorum 
and in humanity . There must be no other group in society which must fulfil this 
standard of public expectation and, at the same time, accept so many constraints .182 
It is probably a sign of the rarity of judicial misconduct that no formal process exists 
to deal with it. However, Justice Fisher is unlikely to be the last judge whose conduct 
is publicly called into question , and a principled approach to issues of judicial 
misconduct is preferable to letting practice develop in an ad hoe fashion during a 
CflSIS. 
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The ultimate goal of both independence and accountability is to advance 
impartial justice and increase public confidence in the capacity of judges to do so. 
Friedland believes that accountability can enhance the public's respect for 
independence. 183 Recognition of this proposition makes it desirable for judges to 
establish a code of conduct and a body that may investigate complaints and state its 
findings. These are modest steps which are consistent with judicial independence but 
may go some way towards enhancing accountability and with it community respect 
for the judiciary. 
The mere process of consultation and discussion involved in the establishment 
of a more credible complaints system and a code of conduct serves a valuable 
function in that it brings the constitutional issues into the open. This educative 
function is valuable for judges who inhabit a different judicial landscape to that of 
their predecessors; for politicians who may be unaware of the constitutional 
consequences of their perhaps hasty or ill-considered words; and for the public who 
may gain a greater appreciation of the place of the judiciary in our constitutional 
arrangements. 
Perhaps, most importantly, the judiciary can only benefit from improvements 
to the system of judicial accountability. Besides the judges gaining a valuable guide to 
future conduct, the existence of a known process, and the process itself, could serve to 
bolster judicial independence by reducing scrutiny and suspicion from the other 
branches of government and from the public. The price to be paid is a modest loss of 
individual independence, sacrificed for the greater good of the judiciary as a whole. In 
other words, more accountable judges ensure a more independent judiciary. 
A judicial mechanism for dealing with intermediate level misconduct leaves 
no reason to relax the convention prohibiting executive comment of the judiciary. 
Even though there is a case for executive comment to be made on judicial 
misconduct, as it is a matter of public interest, the independence of the judiciary is a 
principle that should not be eroded. Public confidence can be enhanced by a judicial 
182 Gerald Gall The Canadian l egal System ( 4ed, Carswell , Ontario, 1995) 314. 
183 Martin L Friedland A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Canadian 
Judicial Council , Ottawa, 1995) xiii . 
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rebuke from a judicial commission. There is then nothing for the government of the 
day to usefully add. It is three hundred years since the judges won their independence 
from the Crown. The visible maintenance of high standards by the judiciary is the key 
to maintaining this independence for the future 
Civic education needs to be seriously addressed for the purpose of enhancing 
public confidence in the judiciary. There is a need to encourage the public to value 
judicial independence. This means being informed and understanding what it is that 
the judiciary, the least visible branch of government, does, and what its relationship is 
with the other branches of government. 
A modern realistic conception of a judge should be that of women and men 
who are human. Real understanding of the choices involved in decision-making is 
preferable to unrealistic expectations of an idealised objective judge dispensing justice 
with the wisdom of Solomon. Human judges bring their attendant strengths and 
weaknesses with them to the bench. Occasionally some will err. But to acknowledge 
mistakes and learn from them is also human. 
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